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 TRADE NEGOTIATION BETWEEN THE
 UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN
 Interest Structures in
 Two-Level Games
 ran_ C Ohien-pin Li
 The United States in the 1980s became more aggressive
 in calling for market liberalization through bilateral or regional negotiations
 with its trading partners. In contrast to traditional protectionism, which
 shielded domestic industries from foreign competition by way of import re-
 striction, the new approach emphasized export expansion. Along with trade
 liberalization, Section 301 of the Trade Act (1974) was strengthened in 1984
 and 1988, giving the president wider authority and discretion in dealing with
 "unjustifiable" or "discriminatory" foreign trade practices.
 Against this background, the Reagan administration initiated a series of
 trade talks with the United States's principal trading partners on market-
 opening measures. The ramifications of these trade talks, however, extend
 beyond the simple idea of regulating imports or exports. Trade negotiations
 often impact the interests of powerful economic sectors on both sides, and
 directly or indirectly affect a government's broader objectives such as em-
 ployment, economic growth, and welfare distribution. They stimulate inter-
 est groups that are much more muted on other international negotiations, and
 the competition of those opposing interests and policy goals, either within the
 economies or between them, creates an intricate dilemma for the negotiators,
 who try to maintain balance amid the diverse forces. Frequently, the negotia-
 tion process involves extensive tradeoffs of various political-economic inter-
 ests in the nexus of domestic and foreign contexts-a subject of significant
 theoretical import in economics and politics.
 Chien-pin Li is Associate Professor of Political Science, Kennesaw
 State College, Marietta, Georgia. He wishes to thank Edward J. Miller, John E. Morser, and
 Dennis D. Riley for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
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 This article attempts to shed light on the dynamics and processes underly-
 ing trade negotiations by examining a typical case: the trade talks between
 the United States and Taiwan. Since the mid-1970s, trade between the two
 countries has expanded, and especially since the early 1980s with the balance
 consistently in favor of Taiwan. With its immense foreign reserves-second
 only to Japan's in the late 1980s-and its huge trade surplus with the U.S.,
 Taiwan became one of the natural targets for the new American policy.
 Under the Reagan administration, a series of negotiations were conducted
 aiming to redress the trade imbalance through bilateral arrangements.
 In analyzing the complexity of the interest competition in the negotiations,
 the pluralist perspective is used as the article's theoretical model. Conven-
 tional wisdom of the pluralist perspective argues that a government's policies
 and positions in foreign economic affairs basically reflect the distribution of
 power or preferences among domestic groups. The holding or rejecting of
 specific foreign economic policy positions is a function of domestic pressure
 politics, and is played out between the official representatives and the various
 social or bureaucratic groups related to the issues in dispute.
 This perspective has been further expanded by Robert Putnam, who devel-
 oped a two-level game metaphor to examine the interactions of domestic
 politics and international pressures in bilateral negotiations.' According to
 Putnam, a set of intertwined domestic and international negotiations exist in
 which it is impossible to reach agreement in an international negotiation
 without some kind of overlapped "win-sets"-that is, the sets of all possible
 international arrangements that are acceptable to the domestic constituents of
 both sides. For Putnam, the size of the "win-set" depends primarily on do-
 mestic institutions and structures, although in some cases these factors may
 be subject to manipulation by the negotiators. Two of the factors are most
 pertinent to this study: the distribution of constituent preferences and the
 participation of organized interests.
 The distribution of preferences might vary with issues, whose potential to
 split a society can be quite different. For instance, issues such as the promo-
 tion of a country's exports, which expands its economy and wealth but has no
 adverse effects on other domestic sectors, are less likely to raise domestic
 controversies. On these "homogeneous" issues, domestic constituents share
 similar preferences and enjoy a high degree of consensus. In such cases, to
 maximize the chance of domestic ratification of the negotiated agreements,
 negotiators tend to follow a hard-bargain, "the more, the better" approach,
 which in fact reduces the size of the win-set. Conversely, when constituent
 preferences are more heterogeneous-when international agreements might
 1. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Game,"
 International Organization, no. 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 427-60.
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 have uneven domestic effects-negotiators may find that some of their own
 people become the "silent allies" of their opponents. In these cases, the pres-
 ence of transnational coalitions will moderate the negotiators' positions and
 expand their win-sets; consequently, it becomes easier to reach an interna-
 tional agreement.
 The participation of organized interests in the negotiation process will also
 affect the size of the win-set. When the costs/benefits of negotiations are
 relatively concentrated on a few sectors or when issues are highly politicized,
 the interests concerned will mobilize to defend their well-being. Their active
 participation in the process then minimizes the autonomy of the negotiators,
 limits the negotiators' maneuvering space, and reduces the size of the win-
 set. Hence, negotiations that are highly politicized on both sides tend to end
 in stalemate.
 In a way, this two-level metaphor represents an effort to predict negotiat-
 ing strategies and behaviors from different situations of "intra-organizational
 bargaining."2 Presumably, negotiations are most difficult in cases of high
 interest homogeneity and mobilization, for they generate the least win-sets.
 The situation then improves when domestic interests become diverse and/or
 unorganized. The following analysis applies Putnam's theoretical perspec-
 tive to trade negotiations between the U.S. and Taiwan, showing the interre-
 lationship between domestic interest structures and the negotiation processes.
 U.S.-Taiwan Trade Negotiations
 Table 1 lists the U.S.-Taiwan trade negotiations in the 1980s, which dealt
 with a wide variety of subjects and problems. Based on the two concepts
 discussed by Putnam, interest homogeneity and interest mobilization, these
 trade issues can be grouped into three categories.3 The first includes issues
 that, for both the U.S. and Taiwan, score high on the homogeneity and mobil-
 ization scales. Here, the distribution of domestic preferences is generally ho-
 mogeneous, with no significant internal splits over bargaining positions.
 Also, interest groups are quite active in these negotiations. All the talks on
 intellectual property rights (IPR) and agricultural issues (i.e., fruits, turkey,
 duck, rice, cigarettes, wine, and driftnet fishing) fall into this category.
 The second group contains the issues marked by heterogeneous interests
 and quiet lobbying. For both the U.S. and Taiwan, there are internal dis-
 2. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations
 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), p. 281.
 3. Negotiations on free trade area and the trade dispute settlement mechanism are excluded
 from this study. These issues were initiated by Taiwan but since they might imply de facto
 recognition of Taiwan's political status, they are considered political rather than trade issues.
 Although these issues were repeatedly put on the agenda, both sides pursued them only half-
 heartedly and obtained no meaningful results.
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 TABLE 1 Major Trade Talks Between the U.S. and Taiwan, 1981-1989
 Issue Date* Agreement Signed
 Trade talk 1981 Trade agreement
 Fishing 1982 Fishing agreement
 1987-89 Fishing agreement
 Textile 1982 Textile agreement
 1983-88
 Rice 1983-84 Rice agreement
 1985-89
 Wine, beer, cigarettes 1984-86
 1984-86 Wine, beer, and
 1988-89 cigarettes agreement
 Intellectual property right 1984-89 Copyright protection
 agreement
 Leasing 1985
 Free trade area 1985-88
 Investment 1985-86
 Insurance 1985-89
 Motion pictures 1985-86
 Machine tools 1986 Machine tools VRA
 1987-89
 Steel 1986
 1987-88
 Trade dispute settlement 1986-87
 mechanism
 Turkey 1986; 1988 Turkey agreement
 Transportation 1986-87
 Banking 1986; 1988-89
 Fruits 1988
 * Date opens when talk begins, and ends when an agreement is reached or no further talk is
 recorded. Talks following an agreement are dated on the next line.
 agreements, but they are not accompanied by active lobbying and, for reasons
 discussed below, interest groups generally take a low profile in the process.
 Generally speaking, negotiations on service industries (banking, insurance,
 investment, leasing, transportation) fit quite well with these features. Issues
 in the third category are related to Taiwan's exports (or American imports),
 including textiles, steel, and machine tools, that can be summed up as "manu-
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 facture issues." On these, the degree of interest homogeneity is high for Tai-
 wan but low for the U.S.; on the other hand, the participation rates of the
 interest groups show that organized interests are active in the U.S. but quiet
 in Taiwan.
 Comparing the patterns of negotiating behaviors/strategies in these three
 types of issues will allow us to understand their variations due to underlying
 differences in preference distribution and interest mobilization.
 Agricultural-IPR Issues
 Generally speaking, Taiwan usually took a "legalistic" negotiating approach
 on agricultural issues to command the high moral ground. In the face of
 strong American market-opening pressures, its negotiators directly chal-
 lenged the legitimacy of these demands by citing American protectionist
 practices. They argued that the indecision of the Uruguay Round and the
 various protectionist practices in the U.S., Japan, and the European Commu-
 nity, all indicated the dubious and fragmentary nature of agricultural trade
 regimes-that is, that the nonexistence of universal rules and the existence of
 American protectionism spoke against the legitimacy of American market-
 opening demands.4 This attitude was also evident in the public remarks of
 some ranking economic officials. For instance, in a legislative interpellation
 session in April 1988, Vice-Economic Minister Chien-Shien Wang said that
 Taiwan would by no means make concessions to the U.S. on agricultural
 products. He further warned that the government would not extend its rice
 agreement with the U.S., not because of its economic impact on Taiwan's
 rice exports, but because of its "unfair" nature.5
 On driftnet fishing, Taiwan took a similar legalistic approach, declining for
 reasons of national sovereignty to grant Americans the right to visit its ves-
 sels to verify fishing violations. On the matter of copyright protection (IPR),
 Taiwan used the provisions of the 1952 Universal Copyright Convention
 (UCC) to question the appropriateness of the American proposal, which had
 allegedly integrated the UCC with the 1886 Bern Convention on a selective
 basis to maximize protection. Also, the U.S. demand to protect copyrights
 retroactively was first turned down by Taiwan on the ground that retroactivity
 contradicted the general legal principle.
 American negotiators, on the other hand, usually sidestepped these legal-
 ity/fairness arguments, approaching the issues from an economic cost/benefit
 perspective. They maintained that American turkey and fruit exports to Tai-
 4. Information is compiled from Wo Kuo Twei Wai Mao I Tsu Shang Tan Pan Chi Yao (Sum-
 mary of foreign trade consultations and negotiations) (Taipei: Ministry of Economics, various
 years).
 5. United Daily News (Taipei), April 22, 1988.
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 wan would not be major problems for Taiwanese farmers since their market
 shares were minimal. They also reviewed fundamental problems of Taiwan-
 ese agriculture, especially involving fruit and dairy farming, concluding that
 American products would not hurt the farmers as much as Taiwan's climate,
 soil, inefficient marketing-distribution structure, and overproduction.6 In ad-
 dition, they asked, if the rice agreement had not impaired Taiwan's rice ex-
 ports, why wouldn't the Taiwan government simply renew it? Even the com-
 plicated legal discussion on IPR was coated with economic incentives.
 American negotiators argued that given Taiwan's recent strength in foreign
 investment and technological innovation, Taiwanese companies would actu-
 ally benefit from strong legal protection for patents, trademarks, and copy-
 rights.
 There are plenty of examples of this kind of legalistic vs. economic ex-
 change in negotiation records but it seemed that these arguments were used
 by both sides simply to defend and justify their predetermined positions. Ne-
 gotiations on the agricultural-IPR issues were the most controversial and con-
 frontational; true dialogue did not seem to exist, and few compromises were
 made following the exchanges. The negotiating processes were marked by
 rigidness and inflexibility, and the uncompromising attitudes of the negotia-
 tors often led to deadlocks. In Putnam's terms, these are the negotiations in
 which there are no overlapping win-sets.
 The stalemates and the inability to reach agreement are indicated by the
 frequency of American threats and coercion, with trade disputes turned into
 economic showdowns. In virtually all of the agri-IPR negotiations, the
 Americans resorted to threats to invoke Section 301 or similar retaliations to
 press for concessions from Taiwan. Such intensity was not seen in the other
 two issue groups. In retrospect, the uncompromising behavior of both sides
 correlated with their domestic interest politics. Politicized issues, mobilized
 interest groups, and the homogeneous preference distributions significantly
 diminished the negotiators' discretionary space, hence reducing their win-
 sets.
 Taiwan's agricultural sector, comprising 17% of the labor force, had been
 coopted by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT) Party since the early 1970s, but in
 the 1980s the farmers, who had traditionally been passive and acquiescent,
 began to protest the influx of foreign agricultural products. In May 1988 a
 series of protests culminated in a massive and somewhat violent demonstra-
 tion against imported turkey and fruits. The farmers' dissatisfaction with cur-
 rent agricultural policies, bolstered by the opposition party's organizational
 6. These arguments were seen in a statement issued by the American Institute on Taiwan
 (AIT), the de facto American embassy, March 16, 1988.
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 and logistical support, nibbled at the KMT's traditional political advantage in
 rural areas and raised concerns within the party.
 The farmers' problems were well publicized by the media, invoking a good
 deal of sympathy from the general public. Opening the market to American
 farm products was frequently portrayed as yielding to imperialist pressures.
 For example, during the talks on American cigarette imports, Taiwan's media
 described the negotiations as the second Opium War. It also perceived al-
 lowing inspection of Taiwan's fishing vessels as an intrusion on national sov-
 ereignty, and said that Taiwan could become a U.S. cultural colony under the
 proposed copyright law revisions. Against this backdrop, agri-IPR negotia-
 tions were not viewed as purely economic issues, as American delegates
 might have portrayed them. Once politicized, trade issues are transformed by
 emotion and nationalism into matters of prestige and dignity, and concessions
 can easily be interpreted as a national humiliation brought about by an in-
 competent government. Thus, Taiwan negotiators lost their autonomy and
 were severely constrained by domestic societal factors, making it difficult to
 take a more conciliatory approach.7
 The American negotiators also faced strong farm lobbies. National organi-
 zations such as the Rice Millers Association, the National Turkey Federation,
 and the Tobacco Institute, as well as regional organizations from states such
 as Florida, California, and Washington were very active in the agricultural
 talks. They repeatedly testified at public hearings on Taiwan's rice exports
 and on cigarette, wine, fruit, and turkey imports, and openly advocated Amer-
 ican retaliation if their demands were not met. Similarly, publishing, phar-
 maceutical, and movie companies were active in the IPR negotiations. These
 organizations mobilized congressional support to pressure Taiwan to open its
 markets, and hired legal consultants who monitored Taiwan's policies and
 kept American officials informed. Agents from these organized interests
 maintained close contact with government officials throughout the negotia-
 tions, on several occasions even exercising a veto power by rejecting working
 drafts and forcing both sides to reopen negotiations. Their assertiveness and
 determination limited the kind of concessions that the American negotiators
 were able to make.
 The intransigence on both sides was further reinforced by homogeneous
 interest structures. For the United States, the promotion of agricultural ex-
 ports and protection of American intellectual property rights incur no domes-
 tic costs, for no social groups will be hurt by the pursuit of these policies. In
 Taiwan, the government's positions on agri-IPR issues were not directly chal-
 7. Yao-tung Chao, chairman of the Council for Economic Planning and Development, took
 note of the situation and asked the public to separate emotionalism from the real issues (China
 Post (Taipei), August 26, 1986).
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 lenged by any domestic groups either, partly due to Taiwan's politicized na-
 tionalism and partly because of inactivity by the large number of unmobilized
 consumers, the real beneficiaries of the open market. As a result, high-inter-
 est homogeneity justified and reinforced the lobbying efforts of agricultural
 groups in both countries.
 Taken together, the U.S.-Taiwan agri-IPR negotiations resemble "distribu-
 tive bargaining" in which negotiators, viewing the bargaining structure as a
 zero-sum game, are reluctant to make concessions.8 The intransigence is
 manifested in such competitive bargaining behavior as warning, bluffing, and
 threatening. The behavior in these negotiations can indeed be attributed to
 the characteristics of the issues-high interest homogeneity and strong socie-
 tal penetration-which create an environment highly adverse to reaching
 agreement. As no compromise or concession was obtained in the process,
 agri-IPR negotiations often reached a stalemate.
 However, as pressure from the dissatisfied farm sector continued to mount,
 American negotiators were forced to use coercive tactics to break the bar-
 gaining deadlock. Interestingly, each time the Section 301 threat was used, it
 effectively changed the dynamics of the process by transforming Taiwan's
 domestic interest structure from homogeneity to heterogeneity. The cigarette
 and wine talks in 1986 illustrate this point. After several unsuccessful negoti-
 ations, the U.S. declared that if Taiwan continued to shut out American ciga-
 rettes and wine from its market, then Taiwan' s footwear, textiles, or
 computer exports would be targets for 301 retaliation. Not surprisingly, the
 announcement stirred apprehension, even panic in Taiwan's export sectors
 which, unwilling to be sacrificed for the cigarette and wine industries,
 launched their own lobby to persuade the government to accept the American
 demands.9 Thus, the effect of the 301 threat was to transform an interna-
 tional dispute into a domestic one, with Taiwan's export sector competing
 with its agricultural sector and putting the Taiwan authorities in the awkward
 position of having to choose between them.
 Although the hardliners still preferred no concession, the effective
 counterlobby from the export sectors-the economic lifeline of Taiwan's ex-
 port-oriented economy-eventually gained the upper hand. Taiwan finally
 gave in and signed the cigarette and wine act. As noted earlier, the U.S.
 repeated the 301 threat in ensuing agricultural talks whenever negotiations
 led nowhere, and each time Taiwan modified its positions and made last-
 minute concessions. The powerful effect of the threat can be explained from
 the perspective of the newly created heterogeneous interest structure.
 8. Walton and McKersie, A Behavioral Theory, p. 11.
 9. United Daily News, October 18, 1986.
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 Service Issues
 The rigidness and inflexibility observed on agricultural issues occur less
 often in negotiations over banking, insurance, and transportation in which
 Taiwan seems to have adopted a middle-of-the-road strategy with a delicate
 balance between acquiescence and defiance. Unlike the outright confronta-
 tion in the agri-IPR talks, Taiwan's negotiators on service issues have ac-
 cepted some American propositions and made adjustments accordingly;
 however, they do delay decisions on questions of great controversy or impor-
 tance.
 These incremental concessions can be seen in a series of market-opening
 measures taken by Taiwan in service sectors since 1985. Under American
 pressure, Taiwan granted foreign banks short-term credit to meet minimum
 reserve requirements (March 1985), allowed foreign banks to join the central-
 ized debit card processing facility (August 1986), extended the limit on time
 deposits from six months to three years (October 1986), permitted foreign
 banks to open a second branch in Kaohsiung (October 1986), and allowed
 them to sell foreign gold coins (April 1988). However, it still maintained
 tight controls over more sensitive areas such as the type of investments and
 loans that foreign banks can make and their ability to influence Taiwan's
 currency market.
 In the case of insurance, Taiwan agreed in April 1987 to grant licenses to
 qualified U.S. insurance companies but restricted the number of licenses is-
 sued each year to four and the kinds of business in which these companies
 can engage (two for life and two for nonlife insurance). In addition, Ameri-
 can insurers were not allowed to invest in the local stock or real estate mar-
 kets on the ground that the influx of their capital might destabilize the small
 local markets. In transportation, Taiwan allowed U.S. carriers to operate as
 their own container terminal operators, shipping agencies, and sea cargo for-
 warders but retained its ban on foreign ownership of trucking operations,
 which was considered by Taiwan as a national security issue that might affect
 its ability to mobilize troops and resources during wartime. Taken together,
 incrementalism characterized Taiwan's bargaining behavior in these issue ne-
 gotiations.
 A similar middle-of-the-road approach was adopted by the American nego-
 tiators. The United States, though preferring a clearer, more comprehensive
 timetable of liberalization, often settled for Taiwan's incremental conces-
 sions. Each time, American negotiators went home with Taiwan's promises
 of change in some minor areas, but they would come back and continue to
 negotiate the yet unresolved parts, which usually meant winning other con-
 cessions. For the U.S., steady improvement, even if slow, meant progress
 and a precedent that could be cited to persuade other states elsewhere.
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 The pursuit of incremental changes by both sides can be explained by the
 lack of interest mobilization in the service sectors. On these issues, the socie-
 tal inputs and constraints on both sides played a far less important role than in
 the agri-IPR negotiations. In Taiwan no nationalistic emotion had been in-
 flamed, and not many private interest groups mobilized to speak for their well
 being. In other words, there was not much participation from the civil society
 in the service negotiations.
 Industries such as banking, insurance, and securities have been heavily
 regulated and closely watched by the Taiwan government for their potential
 destabilizing effects on financial markets. There were no private banks in
 Taiwan during the time of this study; all were owned and managed by the
 public sector with executives appointed by the provincial or central govern-
 ment. This control over the source of capital ensured government leadership
 in the financial sector. Although the securities and insurance industries are
 not as tightly controlled, private companies are balanced by those owned by
 the government. State dominance is also observed in transportation and com-
 munication. On transportation issues, the affected targets-the Kaohsiung
 and Keelung Harbor Bureaus-are government agencies subordinate to the
 administrative control of the Ministry of Communications. The government
 also has monopolistic control of port, railroad, and telecommunication sys-
 tems.
 Given its comprehensive and complete control of these sectors, the govern-
 ment does not leave much room for interest groups to organize or maneuver.
 The conventional view of Taiwan's "strong state-weak society" fits quite
 well in this issue category. The strong state and weak private groups, how-
 ever, do not add up to a homogeneous interest structure. Within the govern-
 ment itself, disagreements abound. In fact, most of the internal policy
 debates and discussions were marked by bureaucratic competition.
 Taiwan's financial-monetary authority has a reputation for policy inertia,
 and is inclined to reject all American demands for change. On the other
 hand, the Ministry of Economics is more sympathetic to free trade ideas that
 can streamline and modernize Taiwan's economic structures, and the Minis-
 try of Foreign Affairs generally emphasizes the importance of maintaining a
 friendly Taiwan-U.S. relationship. Consequently, incrementalism, which ac-
 commodates some of the American demands but buys more time and breath-
 ing space for Taiwan, was the product of internal bureaucratic compromise in
 this kind of heterogeneous interest structure. In the absence of social penetra-
 tion, this easily becomes official policy.
 On the other hand, the societal pressure exerted on American negotiators
 was not as strong as that in the agri-IPR issues. The banks, insurance corpo-
 rations, or other multinationals that want to open Taiwan's service market did
 not embark on such intensive aggressive lobbying. Banking and insurance
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 multinationals, supported by national organizations such as American Bank-
 ers Association and American Insurance Association, did express their dis-
 content with Taiwan's discriminatory measures but they tended to keep a low
 profile. When making complaints, they would contact Taiwan's authority
 directly through local channels such as the American Chamber of Commerce
 in Taipei or American Institute in Taiwan rather than looking for high level
 pressure from the U.S. administration or Congress. This approach might be
 partially explained by the features of their business. Unlike selling products,
 service industries must keep a physical presence, follow local regulations,
 and transact regular business with the host society, making the maintenance
 of a long-term cooperative relationship a better strategy. The more patient
 and moderate postures of the business groups exonerated the American nego-
 tiators from too much societal pressure and allowed them to have more con-
 trol in the talks.
 Moreover, interest distributions in service issues are not entirely homoge-
 neous in the United States. Although opening Taiwan's service market is a
 desirable goal, American negotiators do not want to press the issues too hard.
 They acknowledge that a sudden massive restructuring of Taiwan's service
 industries, especially for those in the financial sector, might disrupt the is-
 land's whole financial system, possibly destabilizing the political balance.
 Thus, their concern in maintaining Taiwan as a stable force in East Asia
 complicates their interest calculations and helps moderate their positions and
 demands. 10
 To summarize, the much more accommodating and responsive behavior on
 both sides in the service negotiations can be explained by their domestic in-
 terest patterns. In the absence of penetration by interest groups in the negoti-
 ating process, negotiators enjoy greater freedom to adjust or modify their
 positions in searching for acceptable compromises in a somewhat heterogene-
 ous bureaucratic structure. This explains why the 301 retaliation threat was
 used only once by the U.S. amid so many intricate problems.
 Manufacture Issues
 During the time-span of this study, the U.S. asked Taiwan to add steel,
 machine tool, and the long-standing textile issues to the agenda and to negoti-
 ate voluntary restraint agreements (VRAs). In contrast to what it did in the
 agri-IPR issues, Taiwan did not seriously question the U.S. about the legality
 or legitimacy of the agenda. Instead, it accepted the quota/VRAs frameworks
 as given, while concentrating on the technical aspects of these issues.
 Taiwan's major concerns in manufacture negotiations were such specific
 items as how to estimate market share of the base year, how to reduce the
 10. Interview with an official of the U.S. Treasury Department, Washington, D.C., June 1990.
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 types of products regulated by quota, and how to enhance the flexibility of
 transferring unused quotas between different categories or different years.
 Categories, quotas, growth rates, carry-over and carry-forward ratios consti-
 tuted the core of the negotiations. All kinds of numbers in hundreds of differ-
 ent products made the manufacture negotiations replete with statistical
 information. Taiwan's negotiators were competent to master these technical-
 ities, and staff would stay late during negotiating sessions to crunch numbers
 and look for data that best served their arguments and interests. In cases of
 disagreement over export-import accounts, they were able to pick up Ameri-
 can statistical mistakes and present accurate convincing evidence on data and
 accounts. In these issues, their efforts paid off by having American customs
 return wrongly detained "overshipment" quotas.
 This technicality-oriented strategy is made possible by the features of the
 interest structures in Taiwan. For all the manufacture issues, Taiwan's inter-
 est distributions are relatively homogeneous. The promotion of exports is
 important to its export-oriented economy and undermines no one's interest.
 This homogeneity reinforces the traditional cooperation and coordination be-
 tween the government and the export sectors. Industry representatives fre-
 quently joined Taiwan's delegations in trade talks and provided relevant
 information; they were especially useful in examining statistical records,
 which gave a special edge to Taiwan's negotiators in mastering the technical-
 ities.
 However, it is the state not the organized interests that controls and domi-
 nates this kind of government-industry linkage. For Taiwan's government,
 the power to distribute quotas and issue export licenses in textiles and
 machine tools adds to its strength in dealing with industries. In the case of
 steel, Taiwan's biggest producer, the China Steel Co., is owned by the gov-
 ernment. Hence, Taiwan's manufacturing sectors are quite dependent on the
 government, which generally controls the direction of manufacture negotia-
 tions. It is the government, not the industries, that makes the final decision
 about whose interests to protect or what kind of concessions to make. While
 the government will do its best to aid Taiwan's industries, when concessions
 are necessary and inevitable, the industries will accept the government's
 judgment.
 In contrast to Taiwan's technical approach in these negotiations, the U.S.
 seemed more interested in the formality and symbolism of the issues. Tai-
 wan's willingness to accept U.S. protectionist goals is a visible policy to
 American domestic manufacturers and other trading partners, satisfying the
 political needs of the U.S. administration. In exchange, American negotiators
 are willing to compromise on less visible aspects such as more flexible cate-
 gorization and application of quotas. For example, the U.S. agreed not to
 bind Taiwan with a formal agreement on steel as long as the latter promised
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 TABLE 2 Issue Characteristics and Bargaining Strategies of the U.S. and Tai-
 wan
 Service Manufacture
 Agri-IPR Issues Issues Issues
 Interest
 homogeneity Taiwan: high then low low high
 U.S.: high low low
 Societal
 penetration Taiwan: high low low
 U.S.: high low high
 Strategies Taiwan: legalistic incremental technical
 U.S.: economic incremental formality
 to exert reasonable self-restraint. Taiwan also reaped real benefits on textile
 issues by making some symbolic concessions. For instance, in 1987 the U.S.
 agreed to extend the bilateral textile agreement and double Taiwan's growth
 rate in exchange for Taiwan's reduction of tariffs on textiles. Given Tai-
 wan's competitiveness in this area, the tariff reduction was more symbolic
 than real.
 The two contrasting approaches (technicality vis-a-vis formality) are es-
 sentially complementary and enable both sides to make give-and-take ex-
 changes. But why would the U.S. exchange some substantive benefits for
 symbolic reasons? The answer can be found in its interest patterns: strong
 societal penetration in a heterogeneous interest structure. The import-
 wracked industries such as textiles and steel have long been actively looking
 for trade protection. Coordinated by national organizations such as the
 American Textile Manufacturers Institute or the American Iron and Steel In-
 stitute, the industries have frequently made dumping charges, sought import
 relief, and pushed for protectionist legislation. They often appeal to national-
 istic feelings by pointing to the economic damage and social dislocation cre-
 ated by foreign competition.
 Their efforts, however, have encountered intensive counterlobbying from
 other trade-dependent groups. Consumer groups, importers, and retailers are
 strongly opposed to protectionist measures that might directly or indirectly
 harm them. Sometimes, these trade-dependent groups even forge transna-
 tional coalitions with foreign industries to undercut protectionist efforts and
 emphasize the economic benefits of the market mechanism and free trade.
 These heterogeneous interests and cross-cutting pressures from proprotection
 and antiprotection groups put the U.S. government in a unique position as
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 mediator between the conflicting interests. The strong but contradicting soci-
 etal inputs limit the choices that the administration can make, forcing it to
 maintain a balance between the conflicting goals of economic nationalism
 and free trade.
 The formality-oriented bargaining approach reflects the American negotia-
 tors' strategy to solve this dilemma. The U.S. would concede the nationalis-
 tic argument by pushing for broader frames of protectionism (the quota and
 VRA systems) but simultaneously retain some free trade ideas by making
 substantive concessions to its trading partners, and indirectly to some domes-
 tic groups, on technical grounds. It was the only way in which negotiators
 could reconcile the domestic heterogeneous interests.
 Taken together (see Table 2), bargaining behaviors/strategies disclose dis-
 tinctive patterns in the three types of trade negotiations. The styles-ranging
 from outright confrontation in the agri-IPR issues to the practical incre-
 mentalism of the service talks-can be explained by the different combina-
 tions of interest distribution (homogeneity vs. heterogeneity) and mobiliza-
 tion (active vs. inactive). The conditions of the agri-IPR issues-high inter-
 est homogeneity and mobilization-minimize the negotiators' maneuvering
 space and encourage aggressive and competitive bargaining. On the other
 hand, situations in service and manufacture areas are more congenial to mu-
 tual coordination and compromise.
 The findings in this case study suggest that the interplay of competing
 political-economic forces in domestic and foreign settings in trade negotia-
 tions may show different patterns on different issues, depending on their in-
 terest alignment. Further exploration of the linkage between issues and
 bargaining behavior merits attention as international trade negotiations can
 only be understood in the context of the different configurations of domestic
 pressure politics.
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